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Bigley: Places of Worship
LO R E N A

M A R T I N E Z

S OTO

JOEL BIGLEY

PLACES OF WORSHIP:
LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE
ON THREAT VULNERABILITY
Abstract: Vulnerability to risk of loss is present in any place where people
assemble. the perspective of leadership on existing threats and their response
to emerging vulnerabilities directly relates to the probability of exploitation.
this article discusses a method that leaders can use to minimize vulnerabilities
in their places of worship. Vulnerability governance can reduce risk loss
through the use of measurable controls. a predictive posture, through the use
of environmental scanning and a mitigation method, helps leaders understand
emerging and residual risks in places of worship.
Keywords: place of worship, risk register, vulnerability governance, threat posture, residual risk, environmental scanning, threat horizon

Introduction
Places of worship (POW) are no longer immune to the violent trends that occur
outside of their property lines. In fact, POWs, as compared to other organizations, have become a target for violence and burglary worldwide. two prominent
researchers on this topic, Dallas Drake, a criminologist at the center for homicide
Research in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and carl chinn, a church-security consultant based in colorado Springs, colorado, have compiled data over the last several years that reflect troubling trends. the data suggests that there are certainly
risks where people gather; places of worship are regular targets of violence. For
example, Dallas Drake counts 137 church shootings from 2006-2016 (Drake,
2018), while carl chinn (2018) looks more broadly at all violence at all houses of
worship, and has tallied more than 250 incidents each in the U.S. in 2015 and
2016. chinn indicates that 2017 was the worst year for violent deaths in faithbased organizations in the U.S. according to chinn, in 2017 there were 118 violent
deaths, including homicides, suicides, and those killed in action (chinn, 2018).
this data is drawn from the National church Shooting Database (1980-2005),
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which is available from IcPSR (Inter-University consortium on Political and
Social Research) in ann arbor, Michigan. the public version of the site (which
uses the same date range) indicates that there were 139 cases (Bixby, Kielmeyer,
& Drake, 2010), whereas most statistics released from the center for homicide
Research released directly to media outlets only contained 137 cases (Drake,
2018). Regardless, news outlets seem to reflect the sentiment that church-related
violence is on the rise (Branson-Potts, 2018; Diep, 2017; Lewis, 2017; MacLellan,
2017; Schenck, 2017).
Where is the balance between faith and action? With this question in mind,
the biblical story of Nehemiah should be considered. In the case of Nehemiah,
the balance between faith and action is clear. Both were in play as he protected
the people by assessing risks and mitigating them through policy and tools, all
while accomplishing the work given to him by God. Similarly, places of worship
(POW) have the unique challenge of providing an inviting environment to attract
parishioners while not being perceived as a soft target for “bad actors.”
according to Merriam-Webster, bad actors are troublemakers who may perform
bad acts (2018), which can induce a variety of harmful and damaging effects.
there are legal definitions of bad acts depending on the context. In this context,
the National church Shooting Database includes bad acts of violence. these
potential troublemakers pose a challenge for leadership and security teams.
Many POWs have ignored the increased threat of risk-related loss. the
“threatscape,” or risk horizon (Mejias, 2012), clearly indicates that many POWs
are soft targets (hesterman, 2014). this is because many of the risks that exist are
tolerated, ignored, or not known. consequently, vulnerabilities are not mitigated
or managed before they are exploited. Now that POWs are at least as vulnerable
to internal and external violence as other organizations, a new leadership perspective needs to be taken so that POWs can improve their vulnerability posture.
a growing number of mega-churches (1310 with >2000 attendees in 2005) in the
U.S. (Warf & Winsberg, 2010) have been improving their security posture by
assembling into communities of practice, such as the Gatekeepers alliance
(crockett, 2006). Even so, many POWs have an attitude of risk avoidance as indicated by an industry expert, Scott Stewart (2017); Stewart is VP of tactical
analysis and is responsible for Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues.
Says Stewart:
there are no functional equivalents to the ScN (Secure community
Network) or the LDS (the church of Jesus christ of Latter-day Saints) security department in the larger catholic, evangelical Protestant and mainline
Protestant communities, though there are some organizations such as the
recently established christian Security Network that have been attempting
to fill the void. Following an incident, awareness of the threat seems to rise
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for a time, and some houses of worship will put some security measures in
place, but for the most part such incidents are seen as events that take
place elsewhere, and the security measures are abandoned after a short
time. (Stewart, 2017)
Given that the environmental system at a POW may be too complex and interdependent to be analyzed as a whole, it must be disaggregated and assessed in
terms of its individual components for better understanding (Boyd & Faulk, 1996;
Sawyerr, 1993). In addition, consideration should be given to the possibility that
domains that make up environmental scanning (ES) methods may change or
drift during a transformation or evolutionary step (choo, 1999; Daft & Weick,
1984; hambrick, 1982). consequently, to accommodate environmental, physical,
and evolutionary changes, structured methods, or frameworks, for assessment
and mitigation should be agile. It is clear that an accurate awareness of a situation through an evaluative framework is critical to task selection and prioritization (hambrick, 1982), helping leaders navigate obstacles and measure impact
(Bossidy & charan, 2002; De Pree, 2004). conversely, even though some objective environmental attributes may differ (Bourgeois, 1985; Snow, 1976; Starbuck,
1976), narrow, parochial, or superficial views are not adequate to handle the
complexity of scanning (Dess & Beard, 1984; Slaughter, 1999). at the core of vulnerability in POWs is the leadership posture of the organization.
ES is a system-based approach that allows information about an organization’s environment to be collected and leveraged for strategic purposes (albright,
2004; choo, 1999; McEwen, 2008; Yasai-ardekani & Nystrom, 1996). Effective
tools must apply to the existing environment, as well as an evolving or anticipated environment. Future scanning (FS) uses early warnings that help leaders
develop a planning horizon around threats that may occur or occur more frequently in the future (aguilar, 1967). Dependencies between environments are
often not understood (Slaughter, 1999), resulting in a lack of real progress along
a strategic roadmap (Brackertz & Kenley, 2002). the roadmap can future-proof
the activity of vulnerability mitigation and strengthen organizational continuity.
On the other hand, perceived but ineffectual progress driven by the illusion of
risk mitigating action may result in a zero net gain.
houses of worship are rarely the focus of federal security or crime prevention
efforts (crockett, 2006). the open environment in POWs can be inviting to street
criminals, hate groups, terrorists, white-collar criminals, common criminals, and
others. a report published by the christian Security Network indicates that there
are 23,000 church crimes per year, of which 1600 are violent crimes based on FBI
data (chadwick, 2018). More current data is difficult to find, as the sources of
many loss-oriented incidents and domestic violence are not reported (Baird,
2018; Shellnutt, 2017). however, a safe assumption is that the amount of crime
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and loss has increased since the study. Proactive preparedness will help faith
leaders “protect the flock” while preserving the resources they use to gather
together.
Even Nehemiah, while building the wall in Jerusalem, took significant precautions against known and unknown threats (Neh. 4). Basic behavioral or event
detection techniques may help identify a potential violent episode before it happens, or provide an opportunity to prevent threat escalation. Unfortunately, violence often takes worshippers by surprise (Romain, 2017). Even if armed guards
are present, do they know what is happening, where it happened, and when it
happened? Even low-frequency events, such as lone wolf attacks, can cause significant losses to occur. a reliance on heroics by those nearby is not the best
strategy. Even though high loss events are infrequent, these threats should be
known and captured on a risk register (Patterson & Neailey, 2002; Baker,
anderson, Bishop, MacLeod, Parkinson, & tuffen, 2014). a risk register should
identify which threats have been mitigated/minimized, list which threats remain,
and be periodically updated. the risk register contents should be known by leadership; they agree to live with the vulnerability that will exist absent any mitigating action. they will also enact mitigations based on priorities and resources.
the amount of time between scanning activities tends to increase with environmental uncertainty; however, scanning frequency decreases when uncertainty is overwhelming, when absorptive capacity is exceeded (choudhury &
Sampler, 1997; cohen & Levinthal, 1990), or when useful information is not
accessible (hough & White, 2004; Mejias, 2012). Why? Because otherwise, these
scanning activities do not produce meaningful results. concurrently, a perception of diminishing returns from scanning efforts in a stable environment may
lull an organization into catatonic complacency (hough & White, 2004) or
entropy (D’aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010; De Pree, 2004), all while risk threats
accumulate unnoticed.
Informal, or ad hoc, scanning by leadership teams is typically short term,
infrequent, fragmented, and may be initiated by a crisis (aguilar, 1967;
hambrick, 1979; hambrick, 1981; Kefalas & Schoderbek, 1973). Even though
leaders typically conduct scanning more frequently (hambrick, 1981), strategy
making may be linked to subjective interpretations in difficult to comprehend
and rapidly changing environments (Elenkov, 1997; Jogarantnam & Wong, 2009;
hambrick, 1981). a proactive stance may be further inhibited when POW leaders
assume that security team leaders are performing scanning when in fact they are
not (hambrick, 1981).
Scanning accuracy is dependent on the threat domains selected and the
approach taken (hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). For example, a kitchen worker might
abide by clear-cut behaviors, while youth leaders without clear role definitions or
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explicit bounds might have a more ambiguous linkage to threat domains
(hambrick, 1981). Perception accuracy is a basis for managerial action (tsai,
MacMillan, & Low, 1991), and scanning is the first step in the development of perceptions (carpenter & Frederickson, 2001; Davis & Meyer, 1998). consequently,
vulnerability assessment voids are particularly risky (hambrick, 1981), jeopardizing needed control implementation. It is clear that continuous scanning must
include structured data collection, using optimized frameworks that clarify perceptions, tasks, and reveal actual results from actions taken (Bourgeois, 1985).
two general measures of scanning strategy are frequency and scope (Beal,
2000; Yasai-ardekani & Nystrom, 1996). the range of characteristics of an expected environment helps leaders make decisions today that align them with a
desired future, at a suitable pace. In high-risk organizations, scanning frequency,
scanning intensity, and scanning type (Jennings & Lumpkin, 1992) matches, or
exceeds, the environmental change rate (choudhury & Sampler, 1997) so that
desired future states can be realized in time (hough & White, 2004; Sawyerr,
1993). a lack of predictability, environmental fluidity, and complexity drive scanning strategies (czarniawska, 2007; Duncan, 1972; Dutton & Jackson, 1987;
Ebrahimi, 2000; thompson, 1967).
Leaders in complex and risk-laden environments are especially challenged to
comprehend threats (anderson & tushman, 2001; Fahey & Narayanan, 1986;
Goll & Rasheed, 1997; Snyder, 1981). Organizations perceive their environments
differently. this perception depends, at least partially, on their strategic
approach, and if data is involved (zahra, 1987). Organizational intelligence influences strategic decision-making. Data completeness and analyzability influences
sense-making (Sutcliffe, 1994). Proactively, data structures must assist with processing needed to develop, pursue, and monitor a strategy (choo, 2001;
Jogaratnam & Wong, 2009; Lau, Liao, Wong, & chiu, 2012). Otherwise, POW
leaders may decide that an environment is unanalyzable, avoiding ES at their
own peril (aguilar, 1967; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999). Ultimately, making
sense of ES activities occurs when leaders construct an assessment strategy by
framing experiences and by creating new capabilities (Milliken, 1987). Strategic
enactment occurs when activity, often simultaneous, is introduced to accomplish
tasks, create new capabilities, and create sense within them. It is clear then that
leaders with limited capacity for information processing have to be efficient in
their approach (Daft & Parks, 1988) to get a predictive picture of what is to come,
hence a need for scanning accuracy.
While this article is focused on POWs, this information can be applied to other
locations. Even though many POWs are unique, the tools presented are transferrable and, with minor modifications, could be practically used in many locations. While some leaders in POWs are taking significant measures to protect
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their flocks, many others believe that the risks they could incur are tolerable.
Some of this risk comes from threat sources, while other sources are the risks
associated with a lack of compliance with policy. to understand this better, leaders must understand what the threats are, how well they are being mitigated, and
have an interest to mitigate the residual risk that exists. the residual risk is the
type and magnitude of the threat that has not yet been addressed. this risk continues to be carried by the leadership of the POW and should be known to them.
this article is broken into five sections. the next section discusses the risk register as a method for vulnerability assessment. Next, there is a brief discussion
about threatscape management, followed by the idea that many leaders have an
illusion of security. In the next section, the author discusses a predictive leadership approach to risk governance. an engaged leader must have mechanisms
that enable the discovery of threats before vulnerabilities are exploited. the
insight gleaned from the tools presented in this article can be used to create
transparency in the environment on an ongoing basis. In the last practical section, a tool is discussed that ultimately will enable the visualization of the
threatscape in its current form and then with the augmented controls enacted.

Risk Register: The Vulnerability Assessment
the document that enables dialogue about and lists the vulnerabilities and
threats in an organization is called a “risk register” (Patterson & Neailey, 2002;
Baker et al., 2014). action can be taken from the transparency created by the tool.
the quantification of risk across the organization allows leadership to apply their
appetite for risk in a more accurate and informed way. Minimally, the risk team
and leadership should be made aware of its contents periodically. at risk are
organizational continuity, loss of property, loss of life, loss of attendance, loss of
ongoing revenue, and brand damage. Each section of the risk register for this
case will be discussed in detail in this section.
the risk register is essential for threat management, as it records identified
risks, their severity, and the actions steps to be taken to reduce threats (Patterson
& Neailey, 2002; Baker et al., 2014). It can be a simple document, spreadsheet, or
a database system, but the most effective format is a table. a table presents a significant amount of information in a small area. Security leaders should use the
risk register as a risk management tool (Patterson & Neailey, 2002; Baker et al.,
2014). It should be reviewed and updated continuously so that it can identify,
assess, and manage risks to acceptable levels. For leaders to decide what mitigation is acceptable, they need to know the risks that are present and have a clear
understanding of their risk appetite. Not all risks are known, and some emerge
over time. however, existing threats can be determined based on insight from
security team members, past events, and from news accounts both local and
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national. Even with this information in hand, allowances should be made for surprises. the register provides a framework in which known elements that threaten
the activities at POWs are captured.
Setting up the risk register is important for clarity and understanding of the
threatscape (Patterson & Neailey, 2002; Baker et al., 2014). Leaders comprehend
scanning results when they understand the interaction between identified
threats and their influence on the local risk taxonomy (aguilar, 1967; hambrick,
1979; Kefalas & Schoderbek, 1973; Venkatraman, 1989). attributes of variables in
ES could include: environmental complexity, rate of change, organization size,
impact and frequency of risk events, as well as information source reliability
(Jennings & Lumpkin, 1992; Lindsay & Rue, 1980; Robinson, 1982; Valencia,
2010). the need for these variables, their variety, an acceptable variation range
within each one, and their weighting validate the need to customize a scanning
framework to a specific location.
the literature categorizes variables as controllable (ex. location, parishioner
base, task assignment, organizational structure, and capacity) and uncontrollable (ex. parishioner behavior, collaboration between functional areas, technology changes, economic conditions, attendance drivers, and regulatory restrictions) (Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979). controllable variables can be influenced while
uncontrollable variables typically require forced adaptation (Mitroff & Emshoff,
1979). an example of forced adaptation could be the establishment and enforcement of a policy. a vulnerability measuring system needs to accommodate these
attributes and accurately represent the threats and associated variables chosen.
Of course, data collection planning and analysis methods assure that the data
collected is complete, relevant, and timely (choudhury & Sampler, 1997).
the risk register must be current and transparent to leadership, so they can
see which risks or vulnerabilities they are tolerating, and which ones are being
addressed (Patterson & Neailey, 2002; Baker et al., 2014). Leaders may flag risks
that haven't been registered so that they are included in the vulnerability measurement and so that leadership can provide options for risk mitigation. there
are several key sections to the register. an overview of the figure on the next
page, an actual place of worship risk register, is discussed.
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Figure 1. Example risk register sections (Note: the content is intentionally unreadable to focus
attention on the sections.)

the risk register’s owner is listed at the top on the left, next to the risk register’s POW. this person should be on the security team and is responsible for
adding threats as they emerge or are discovered. the landscape is constantly
changing, and the risk register needs to be kept up to date so that leadership is
aware of the vulnerabilities and actions taken to mitigate them.
Each threat should be assessed on several levels. First, once registered, the
threat can be given an item number for reference. the first digit can be related to
the type of threat (ex. “1” for burglary) with the decimal number being the action
from the threat source (ex. “1.1” for stealing instruments). this allows for a breakdown of a threat into risk loss categories and is illustrated in the figure below.
Each threat action can
RISK REGISTER
be described in terms of
Description
Event type
Number
the probability and severity
Instruments
Burglary
1.1
of the occurrence. the
Cash
Burglary
1.2
probability and severity are
Computers
Burglary
1.3
Sound Boards
Burglary
1.4
simply defined as high,
Copper
Burglary
1.5
medium, or low. No one
Active shooter
Assault
2.1
Armed robber
Assault
2.2
knows this better than the
Fight
Assault
2.3
security team, as they
Fall
Injury
3.1
know the history and
Vehicle ram
Terrorism
4.1
Shooting
Terrorism
4.2
impact of losses. the probBathrooms
Sexual assault
5.1
ability and severity numSport Court
Sexual assault
5.2
bers are an 8 for high, a 5
Nursery pickup
Abduction
6.1
Parking lot
Abduction
6.2
for medium and a 3 for
Arson
Fire
7.1
low. these two numbers
Homeless
Fire
7.2
(probability and severity)
Graffiti
Vandalism
8.1
Animal bite
Animal
9.1
multiplied by each other
Earthquake
Natural Disaster
10.1
produce the risk priority
Fire
Natural Disaster
10.2
number (RPN). the spreadFigure 2. Example risk register
sheet can be sorted on this
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column from highest to lowest to produce a prioritized list of threats. this may
help with consensus regarding which risk to work on first. By reducing the highest priority threats first, the RPN is reduced faster. the average probability and
severity will be reduced with increased mitigation influence on the risk. In the
meantime, these three numbers can be used as a baseline for the current
threatscape along with the existing mitigating controls. typically, when the riskloss type is human, the severity number will be higher. these elements are
shown in the figure below.
RISK REGISTER

RISK ANALYSIS

Number

Event type

Description

Probability Probability#

Severity

Severity#

RPN

Risk Loss

1.1

Burglary

Instruments

High

8

Medium

5

40

Property

1.2

Burglary

Cash

High

8

Medium

5

40

Property

1.3

Burglary

Computers

High

8

Medium

5

40

Property

1.4

Burglary

Sound Boards

High

8

Medium

5

40

Property

1.5

Burglary

Copper

High

8

Medium

5

40

Property

2.1

Assault

Active shooter

Low

3

High

8

24

People

2.2

Assault

Armed robber

Low

3

High

8

24

People

2.3

Assault

Fight

Low

3

Medium

5

15

People

3.1

Injury

Fall

Medium

5

Medium

5

25

People

4.1

Terrorism

Vehicle ram

Low

3

High

8

24

People

4.2

Terrorism

Shooting

Low

3

High

8

24

People

5.1

Sexual assault

Bathrooms

Medium

5

Medium

5

25

People

5.2

Sexual assault

Sport Court

Medium

5

Medium

5

25

People

6.1

Abduction

Nursery pickup

Low

3

High

8

24

People

6.2

Abduction

Parking lot

Low

3

High

8

24

People

7.1

Fire

Arson

Low

3

High

8

24

Property

7.2

Fire

Homeless

Low

3

High

8

24

Property

8.1

Vandalism

Graffiti

Medium

5

Low

3

15

Property

9.1

Animal

Animal bite

High

8

Medium

5

40

People

10.1

Natural Disaster

Earthquake

Medium

5

High

8

40

All

10.2

Natural Disaster

Fire

Medium

5

High

8

40

All

Average

5.00

Average

6.33

617

Total RPN

Figure 3. Example risk analysis

In a column to the right of the risk loss type, the existing controls can be listed
as shown below. It is good to know how strong the controls are for mitigating the
risk. Where the controls are not strong, they should be enhanced to reduce the
RPN. Nehemiah didn’t just post a guard. he also had the wall builders keep their
arms nearby when they ate and when they worked. he took extra measures to
make sure that the work was not threatened or compromised. the actions
Nehemiah took were seen by bad actors and became a deterrent. If Nehemiah
had not predicted the risk threats, then his actions would not have been eventually taken.
there are four types of leaders as described in this article:
l

Predictive–anticipates that threats will emerge.

THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP

Published by Digital Commons @ Andrews University, 2018

PAGE 49

9

Journal of Applied Christian Leadership, Vol. 12 [2018], No. 1, Art. 6
P L AC E S

O F

WO R S H I P

l

Proactive–mitigates threats that are known before loss occurs.
l
Reactive–focuses on recovery after a loss has occurred.
l
Non-reactive–do not recover from an exploited vulnerability.
In the table below the existing controls are listed against the threat sources.
the power of the controls is represented by two values based on a Likert scale
below.
the first, mitigation, is the extent to
which the control mitigates the threat. the
Mitigation or Awareness
0
No control
other, awareness, is the extent to which the
2
Very little
control makes those who can take action to
4
Little
mitigate loss aware of the threat so that
6
Some
8

Strong

10

Very strong

they can take action. again, the average
values of the mitigation and awareness
variables can be seen as a baseline to be
Figure 4. Likert scale for mitigation and
awareness values
improved.
the current threatscape is now documented. the known threats are registered
along with their potential impact. the existing mitigating controls and their
influence is documented with measures. With this information, the solutions part
of the risk register can be exploited to reduce baseline values. Leadership will

RISK REGISTER

RISK MITIGATION

Number

Event type

Description

Current Control

Mitigation

Awareness

1.1

Burglary

Instruments

Alarm/locks on external doors and CCTV

2

1

1.2

Burglary

Cash

Alarm/locks on external/internal doors and CCTV

2

1

1.3

Burglary

Computers

Alarm/locks on external/internal doors and CCTV

2

1

1.4

Burglary

Sound Boards

Alarm/locks on external doors and CCTV

2

1

1.5

Burglary

Copper

CCTV

1

0

2.1

Assault

Active shooter

CCTV

1

1

2.2

Assault

Armed robber

CCTV

1

0

2.3

Assault

Fight

CCTV

1

1

3.1

Injury

Fall

CCTV

0

1

4.1

Terrorism

Vehicle ram

CCTV

0

0

4.2

Terrorism

Shooting

CCTV

1

1

5.1

Sexual assault

Bathrooms

CCTV, policy, hall monitor, training, background chk.

1

0

5.2

Sexual assault

Sport Court

CCTV

1

1

6.1

Abduction

2

1

6.2

Abduction

Parking lot

CCTV

1

1

7.1

Fire

Arson

CCTV, fire alarm

4

3

7.2

Fire

Homeless

CCTV

1

1

8.1

Vandalism

Graffiti

CCTV

0

0

9.1

Animal

Animal bite

CCTV

0

0

10.1

Natural Disaster

Earthquake

CCTV

0

0

10.2

Natural Disaster

Fire

Smoke detectors and alarm

4

4

1.29

0.90

Nursery pickup Tag system

Average

Figure 5. Example existing controls and their impact
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need to decide if physical or procedural controls will be used. If procedural controls are used, a discussion about enforcing the procedures will be relevant.
additionally, the reaction time to threats must be minimized and methods for the
enforcement of policies will need to be considered. the choices made have an
effect on the existing vulnerabilities and reduce the risk threat values.
the mitigations taken are unique to each site and so are not listed; however,
their impact is listed in the table below. this table indicates that each control was
augmented to a varying degree based on a like-for-like assessment in relation to
the based control. the net impact is a 73% reduction in the RPN. this reduction
is reflected by the difference between the current and the future RPN, or the projected risk priority number (PRPN), and is labeled as the percent reduction
between these two numbers. the control augmentations and enhancements (not
listed) will need to be assessed for their influence on the threats, resulting in an
improvement in awareness of threats, an improvement in mitigation power, a
reduction in the probability of occurrence, and a reduction in severity if the vulnerability is exploited. While the percent reduction in risk is not exact, it represents a method that was applied to a case to measure risk threats. also, it shows
considerable impact from the actions that were taken. If the percent reduction

Projected

Future Power of Control

RISK REGISTER
Number

Event type

Description

Mitigation

Awareness

Probability#

Severity#

PRPN

1.1

Burglary

Instruments

4

5

1

5

5

1.2

Burglary

Cash

4

5

1

5

5

1.3

Burglary

Computers

4

5

1

5

5

1.4

Burglary

Sound Boards

4

5

1

5

5

1.5

Burglary

Copper

4

5

1

5

5

2.1

Assault

Active shooter

2

5

2

8

16

2.2

Assault

Armed robber

4

5

1

8

8

2.3

Assault

Fight

3

4

2

3

6

3.1

Injury

Fall

3

4

5

3

15

4.1

Terrorism

Vehicle ram

0

5

3

7

21

4.2

Terrorism

Shooting

2

5

2

4

8

5.1

Sexual assault

Bathrooms

4

5

0

5

0

5.2

Sexual assault

Sport Court

3

4

2

5

10

6.1

Abduction

Nursery pickup

5

5

0

8

0

6.2

Abduction

Parking lot

2

3

2

8

16

7.1

Fire

Arson

3

4

3

3

9

7.2

Fire

Homeless

5

5

0

8

0

8.1

Vandalism

Graffiti

4

5

1

3

3

9.1

Animal

Animal bite

3

3

2

5

10

10.1

Natural Disaster

Earthquake

0

4

5

3

15

10.2

Natural Disaster

Fire

3

5

2

3

6

3.14

4.57

1.76

5.19

168

-59%

405%

-65%

-18%

449
73%

Figure 6. Example threatscape with augmented controls
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were ten percent, then leadership would need to require more analysis so that
stronger solutions are brought forward.

Threatscape Management
the contents of the register will indicate if the facility is a hard or soft target
(Patterson & Neailey, 2002; Baker et al., 2014). this posture will be clear to lone
wolves and burglars alike, leading to either an invitation or deterrence. as stated
in the previous section, the register includes the value assigned to the risk, crime
type, description of the crime, probability of occurrence of the action happening,
severity if it did happen (high, medium, low), type of risk (people, property, reputation, etc.), mitigation decided upon, and if the mitigation control is effective
or not.
a domain is weighted relative to the influence of other domains in the framework. a dominant outcome driver, or dominant domain, should not be ignored
or treated as an equal. Domain weights can be assigned using a Likert scale, or
be linked to variable significance. Domain-specific tasks and their weights inform
the overall strategic plan. an understanding of the dynamic nature of internal
and external metrics (Bandy, 2002), a prospect of future expectations (chrusciel,
2011), and an awareness of the weighted performance drivers on the critical path
are essential to the strategic plan.
the security team and leadership representation on the security team must
decide what mitigation to deploy should be based on a cost-benefit analysis.
they must also assure that the augmented control is in place. additionally, they
must have the means to know if the control has fallen out of place such that it is
not mitigating the threat anymore. While the threat risk may be reduced, it may
not disappear. When it is still present, it should stay on the register. It may be
described differently, if needed. the frequency of occurrence of a loss should be
reduced with the mitigation deployed.

Illusion of Security
Many leaders embrace an illusion of security. For example, a place of worship
may have 140 surveillance cameras on its campus. these cameras may be offline,
broken, dirty, not focused, with insufficient resolution, have a poor field of view,
or be pointed in the wrong direction. however, when the leader is asked if they
have adequate security management, their response is that there are 140 cameras
covering the campus. While providing some deterrent value, having a large number of cameras does not provide the mitigating control to reduce threats since
obfuscation techniques are well known. While insurance companies value camera systems, they typically do not check to see if they are working or even capable of forensic analysis. the intention of having these cameras is that they be
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used as a forensic tool to find out what happened after a crime is committed,
assuming the needed footage is available. In the event that criminals do not
remove the video storage device, other issues with the system may keep forensic
footage from being available to law enforcement. cameras may not handle light
well, not have an appropriate field of view, go black in the dark, be out of service, flare when pointed towards sunlight, be obstructed, or be blinded by a
nearby light source. the perception of security is not the same as good security.
Understanding threats is the start of a mitigating design. having a system that is
able to de-escalate a threat scenario will reduce recovery losses as they may mitigate a bad act before it happens. consequently, a threat-based approach is not only
more effective, it is also cheaper. For example, purchasing surveillance equipment
to cover areas where the threat is low or non-existent is a waste of resources, considering these resources should be collecting data where the risk is higher.
It is worth noting that often the assumption is that a building alarm system
will take care of the security needs of the facility. Many thieves (specifically those
who are repeat offenders) have adopted shared “best practices,” which have
made them successful. With this knowledge, for example, a thief might know
that it is possible to cut power in the power panel (or even at the meter), as well
as cut the telephone or internet lines to the building, eliminating communication. It is also possible to disable alarm boxes. Even if communication is not cut,
thieves typically know the response times to get in and out before the police
arrive (“smash and dash”). While bad actors may only take items that will return
$1000, they may cause $5000 worth of damage to achieve this. Damage to doors
can be done to gain entry; however, “bumpkeys” can be used to gain access to
almost any lock without damage. Burglars may also take DVR/NVR video storage
with them, removing forensic evidence from the scene. When these scenarios are
logged in the risk register, leaders become aware of vulnerabilities. Otherwise,
they may believe that their existing security controls are keeping them secure,
when in fact it is not the case.

Predictive Approach
this paper is not about the risk register, but rather the use of it to improve the
security posture of a POW. an analysis produces no value until it is acted upon.
consequently, the scope of the discussion needs to include leadership’s status
quo posture, and a posture that reduces the opportunity for risk-based losses and
liabilities. the evolving discussion then includes the author’s position, that there
are four types of leaders with regard to risk management.
the most vulnerable leader is the “head in the sand” leader. this leader does
not think that anything could happen and if it does, then it was supposed to be
that way. When an issue occurs, this POW will likely close down. the congre-
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gation will disburse, and the leaders will find new places to lead or become
members of the flock. the damage is done, and the leader did not serve the
interests of the parishioners. a defense that “it was supposed to be that way”
may be an excuse for abdicating responsibility.
the second kind of leader is the reactive leader. the emphasis here is on
recovery after a loss. a collection will be taken from the congregation to pay
for the damage. an insurance claim is filed, and the rest of the cost–including
the deductible–is taken from the reserve fund, if it exists. this money will be
used to restore the property to the extent possible over a period of time.
the third type of leader is a proactive leader; this leader will take action to
prevent risk loss from happening. Generally, this posture works except when
a threat emerges that was not considered in the risk mitigation plan. In all of
these cases, human loss is tragic. the proactive leader will try to minimize
losses through preparedness and enhanced controls.
Finally, the predictive leader approaches the threatscape anticipating that
changes in the threatscape will occur. as threats emerge or transpire elsewhere, this leader thinks about mitigations immediately. this leader thinks
about threat possibilities and logs them. the predictive leader doesn’t need to
recover because mitigations are anticipated and in place prior to the threat
visiting the place of worship. the predictive leader will keep property, brand,
and human loss from happening.
It is better to be predictive than reactive. this position is based on
Nehemiah 4. While building the wall, Nehemiah understood the threats and
took the right action in relation to predicted threats. he “posted a guard.” he
implemented other controls to make sure the builders were ready for any
threat. While all threats cannot be mitigated, stewardship demands an
approach that prevents losses. Bad actors may have decided not to take malicious action because of Nehemiah’s preparations. threats should be known
and mitigated before they have the opportunity to cause damage.
Organizations should anticipate the discovery of threats and be able to
assume a posture quickly to thwart the threat or discourage it. In some cases,
controls may also help keep risk threats from escalating, as mitigating action
can be executed before the severity of the threat increases. When leaders are
ready to deter malicious acts, bad actors stand down.

Loss Likelihood and Impact
the ability to minimize loss by prioritizing preventive actions can be further understood through a risk threat matrix, as shown below. In this case,
leadership can decide on the actions to take first by looking at the likelihood
of a loss and the impact of it. When the existing controls are augmented and
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INITIAL VALUES

Number

Event type

Description

Impact

Likelihood

Speed of Onset

1.1

Burglary

Instruments

4

9

7

1.2

Burglary

Cash

4

9

7

1.3

Burglary

Computers

4

9

8

1.4

Burglary

Sound Boards

4

8

7

1.5

Burglary

Copper

6

8

8

2.1

Assault

Active shooter

10

1

10

2.2

Assault

Armed robber

10

9

10

2.3

Assault

Fight

4

3

7

3.1

Injury

Fall

4

6

10

4.1

Terrorism

Vehicle ram

10

1

10

4.2

Terrorism

Shooting

10

3

10

5.1

Sexual assault

Bathrooms

9

7

6

5.2

Sexual assault

Sport Court

9

5

5

6.1

Abduction

Nursery pickup

10

6

8

6.2

Abduction

Parking lot

10

7

9

7.1

Fire

Arson

6

7

5

7.2

Fire

Homeless

6

7

5

8.1

Vandalism

Graffiti

4

7

4

9.1

Animal

Animal bite

6

9

4

10.1

Natural Disaster

Earthquake

9

4

10

10.2

Natural Disaster

Fire

7

5

4

7.0

6.2

7.3

Figure 7. Example values for the risk threat matrix

deployed, the RPN is reduced.
the risk threat matrix can be illustrated by taking each item from the risk
register and giving it a location and relative area on a heat map. a heat map is
a visual representation of data, using colors with associated values. the
threatscape is essentially a heat map that shows which threats are critical and
which ones are relatively insignificant. a severe impact along with an almost
certain likelihood is the largest risk-loss threat. In this case, it is armed robbery. Robberies are common, and when armed, bad actors can injure or kill
people who are in the church during the robbery. Other events are also severe,
such as a terroristic shooting; however, this is not as common an occurrence
as an armed robbery. the relative values of the threat type can be validated
through a quantitative survey or through local crime statistics.
the area that represents each threat index relates to the speed of onset. the
speed at which the threat is enacted is critical from a reaction time perspective. With a rapid speed of onset, the ability to mitigate the loss and de-escalate the event after the act has been initiated is very low. consequently, the
losses will be higher when this threat is enacted as illustrated in the figure
below. the values reflected by the risk loss matrix are set by the local security
team and agreed upon by leadership.
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Minor

Moderate

Major

Severe
Critical

Certain

9–10

2.2
1.1,2,3

9.1

1.4

1.5

Low
5.1

Likely

6.2

7–8

Very Low

6.1

7.1,2

8.1

High

Possible

5–6
3.1
5.2

10.2

10.1
Unlikely

3–4
4.2

2.3

2.1 & 4.1

Rare

0–2

3–4

5–6

7–8

0–2

9–10

Figure 8. Example risk loss matrix

the risk loss matrix above is the current state prior to augmented controls.
the impact of more powerful controls will reduce the speed of onset (the box size
around the number), while shifting the location of the box in the heat map from
critical to very low. In other words, the box around the number will shrink as the
enhanced control increases the time of onset. the number and its shrinking box
will move towards the left as the augmented control reduces the impact of an
exploited vulnerability. also, the number with its box will move downwards as
the likelihood of the exploited vulnerability occurring is reduced. a reduction in
the RPN ultimately indicates the management of the threatscape and a reduction
in vulnerability at the POW. In sum, the movement of risk threats from the top
right to the bottom left (the red zone to the green zone) makes them less likely,
less impactful, and thus results in longer onset time. to accomplish this, leadership needs to be focused on the effective deployment of robust risk mitigations.
having the right leadership for change activities is critical (Bossidy & charan,
2002; heifetz, 1994; Smith, Ferrier, & Grimm, 2001; Wilkinson, 2006). an effective
leader needs to be an articulate and enthusiastic conceptualizer who is good at
grasping strategies and explaining them (Bossidy & charan, 2002). Leadership
includes prioritization, deployment, and measurement against established goals.
If outcome measurements indicate that effort has fallen short of a target, a leader
may initiate a limited improvement cycle as remediation. additionally, a framework review may be prudent due to project duration and environmental turbulence. a framework conceived during a time of stability may not be applicable
during or following a time of volatility (D’aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010). Once
the framework design has been fine-tuned and verified as being appropriate by

PAGE 56

https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/jacl/vol12/iss1/6

Vol. 12, No. 1 SPRING 2018

16

Bigley: Places of Worship
J O E L

B I G L E Y

the POW security team, an accountable leader should initiate a repeat scan to
refresh the gap analysis data. continuous improvement is an aggressive leadership activity, allowing an organization that embraces learning to keep pace with
a rapidly evolving environment (Ferrier, 2001; Mintzberg, ahlstrand, & Lampel,
1998).

Conclusion
clarity around strategic planning is needed for better organizational outcomes. through collective sharing, predictive learning, and reflection, leaders
can enhance their ES techniques by using meaningful tools. Quick wisdom generation is needed in a fast-paced environment; however, sometimes these efforts
to collect information are hampered by constraints imposed by internal and
external sources. For example, the availability of critical information may be a
challenge for a decision-maker due to a lack of an organizational intelligence
gathering capability or from an incomplete awareness of legal constraints. By
increasing the “speed to wisdom,” strategic enactment, the potential is heightened and a more secure posture is achieved. Practically, an information collection capability coupled with an adaptive culture can be helpful in turning wisdom into action, as long as data is collected and recorded accurately, and can be
extracted in a meaningful format (choudhury & Sampler, 1997; Davis, 1985).
Strategic agility enables an organization to achieve desired outcomes (Sull,
2010) while sustaining organizational success (D’aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010).
Potentially strategic agility can be expressed in an algorithm as follows:
Strategic Agility = ES Accuracy x Agility x Adaptability
to elaborate, scanning accuracy is simply the capability to obtain and exploit
knowledge of an organization’s situation in its environment, both current and
future. agility is the ability to minimize the negative influence of obstacles on
momentum needed for adaptation. adaptability is an organization’s ability to
transform itself to stay ahead of threats, thereby preserving or increasing the
organization’s viability and efficacy (Davis & Meyer, 1998).
In some cases, strategic planning is ad hoc with a dependency on serendipity
that may or may not be forthcoming (aguilar, 1967; hambrick, 1979; hambrick,
1981; Kefalas & Schoderbek, 1973). alternatively, some organizations see value in
planning and execution (Bossidy & charan, 2002; charan, Bossidy, & Burck,
2012). Organizations that plan may underestimate the complexity that exists
between the environment and the aspect of the organization. Even a mature
organization may not appropriately understand or leverage the links between
domains that can improve outcome potential. For example, a control to mitigate
vulnerability in one area may have a positive or negative impact in another. to
understand this better, a confident organization, inviting of criticism, may allow
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their concerned parishioners, department leaders, and members of the security
team to influence their framework design, its weighting, and the metrics that are
being applied to have a better understanding of the complex and dynamic environment (De Pree, 2004).
task selection within a threat domain directly impacts domain specific goal
achievement (Bourgeois, 1980). these tasks are aligned with goals imposed on a
situation. ambiguity, uncertainty, and an understanding of residual risk in a system are critical aspects of environments in transition (Daft & Weick, 1984;
Wilkinson, 2006). Specifically, perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) is the
difference between information needed to make a decision about a task and
information available (Galbraith, 1973). PEU tends to mask composite measures
sought after during scanning activities that drive task creation (Boyd & Faulk,
1996). concurrently, leaders tend to act on a perceived environment (Boyd, Dess,
& Rasheed, 1993) with a goal of achieving a desired adaptation to a more secure
posture (Davis & Meyer, 1998; hambrick, 1981). task leaders must also know that
environmental variation relates to changes that may occur independently of a
leader’s ability to notice, comprehend, or interpret environment-related data
(Doty, Bhattacharya, Wheatley, & Sutcliffe, 2006). consequently, organizations
tuned into their environment, while allowing for discovery, are more likely to
succeed because they are able to respond predictively through meaningful action
and contingencies to a wide range of signals (Slaughter, 1999). Leaders must
understand that the security locus of control includes those who attend the POW
and those who live or work nearby.
When direct (parishioners) and indirect (neighbors of the POW) stakeholders
know that a strategic plan is thorough, and when they are given opportunities to
influence the plan (chrusciel, 2011), they are more inclined to be cooperative and
in alignment with the objectives. Engaged stakeholders are also more likely to
follow a meaningful path laid out for the organization, even if sacrifice is
involved (De Pree, 2004). Even so, it is better to achieve a goal through strategy
than through sacrifice. although complexity is intensified with the diversity that
exists within the stakeholder population, the methods discussed in this article
aid in efficient and timely ongoing accomplishment of organizational postural
transitions necessary in turbulent and evolving risk environments (aguilar, 1967;
choo, 1999; El Sawy, 1985; Kefalas & Schoderbek, 1973; McEwen, 2008).
this article has attempted to provide theoretical models for the listing and
assessment of threats, along with the power of the mitigating controls currently
in place. the model also allows for improvement on the threatscape through
quantitative control augmentation. While each situation is different, this article
demonstrates that the opportunity to exploit vulnerabilities can be reduced significantly using the tools presented. clearly, more research is needed to enable
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POWs and other similar organizations to rapidly evolve their threat governance
capabilities so that risk-based loss is averted. as threats continue to evolve, rigidity of approach by leaders in places of worship puts lives and property at risk.
conversely, predictive leaders, through the use of suitable ES tools can reduce
risk loss through posture adaptations.
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